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Curtis: Teaching Free Speech

TEACHING FREE SPEECH FROM AN INCOMPLETE FOSSIL R ECORD
by
Michael Kent Curtis*
I. INTRODUCTION
The second part of this symposium has been devoted to how we teach the Constitution. It
has emphasized what gets left out. The reader will see a pattern. Paul Finkelman is a leading
scholar on the law of slavery and the Constitution. Paul thinks – and I believe he is correct – that
the immense influence of slavery on American constitutional law is too often neglected in our
constitutional law courses. James Wilson has studied how political philosophers – Aristotle,
Rousseau, James Harrington, and others – have understood the distribution of wealth as a central
factor affecting how the constitution of a nation actually works. Jim thinks that this important
issue has been ignored in most constitutional law courses, and I think he is also right. I have
devoted almost ten years to studying free speech struggles from 1798 to 1868 – how they shaped
both our understanding of free speech and how they shaped section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a free speech guarantee. I see that as a crucial part of the story that often gets left
out. It is easy to dismiss my view as self-serving because, of course, it is.
Even if the critiques have merit, it does not necessarily follow that casebooks and courses
should change. In a world of limited time and space, every addition requires a subtraction.
Whether, on balance, change would be positive is something each teacher must judge.
The University of Akron School of La w is an appropriate place for a discussion of lost
storiesthe stories that get lost in the teaching of constitutional law, for example, that of J. John
A. Bingham, the main author of the Fourteenth Aamendment’s great first section. Bingham is an
unsung American hero, the single person most responsible for the great protections of section
one of the Fourteenth Amendment – protections against state abridgment of due process, equal
protection, and privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but few know who he is.
*

B.A. University of the South, J.D. University of North Carolina. Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School
of Law.
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Dean Richard Aynes is the nation’s leading expert on John A. Bingham. 1
Today, I want to discuss another neglected part of the story of the Constitution, one that
is intimately related to John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment as a free speech guarantee.
When my son, Matthew, was about three years old, he became fascinated by dinosaurs. I
am not sure why very small boys are so interested in huge extinct beasts. Perhaps, it is this: “I
am small, but you are extinct.” Perhaps somehow they feel they share the dinosaur’s power.
Perhaps, it is simply awe. At any rate, we made many trips to the Greensboro Natural Science
Center where Matthew never tired of inspecting a life-sized model of a Tyrannosaurus Rex. In
the gift shop we could, and did, buy scale model dinosaurs that were supposedly anatomically
correct.
Of course, I knew that the scientists who gave us re-creations of the dinosaurs had never
seen one. But we gave little thought to how they arrived at their reconstructio ns. We tend to
accept the world presented to us by the experts. The experts, of course, are sometimes mistaken.
At least one recent reconstruction has proved to be a mistake, a composite arrived at by
mistakenly combining the bones of two different species. The lead sentence in a USA Today
story announced that “The ‘missing link’ dinosaur-bird featured by National Geographic
magazine in November is a fake.”2
II. EXCAVATING FREE SPEECH HISTORY
For almost ten years, I have been excavating selected episodes in free speech history,
mostly episodes before and during the Civil War. My reconstructions appear in the book, Free
Speech, The People’s Darling Privilege: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American
History. 3 The book is a series of interlocking stories about some major free speech controversies
1

See generally Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57
(1993); Richard L. Aynes, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Seven Deadly Sins of Legal
Scholarship, 8 W M. & M ARY BILL RTS. J. 405 (2000) (reviewing A KHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)).
2

Tim Friend, Dinosaur-bird Link Smashed in Fossil Flap, USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 2000, at 1D.

3

M ICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE : STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN A MERICAN HISTORY (2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE ].
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in American history from 1798 to 1868. It also has a chapter that looks at the modern fate of the
early theories that were urged to justify suppressing speech. This enterprise and my earlier work
on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights have led me to think about the perils and
joys of reconstructing the past – and about incomplete fossil records. 4 My excavations have also
led me to think about how we teach constitutional law and what is often left out.
III. CASEBOOKS – WHAT THEY ARE FOR AND HOW WE M IGHT MISUSE THEM
Before I tell you a bit about these controversies, I want to discuss the picture of the
historic free speech animal that might be inferred by readers of the constitutional law casebooks
that I studied in the 1960s. The stories I tell about the background of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a free speech guarantee were not reported in the casebooks I studied as a law student and,
though things are improving, to a significant extent that is still so today – even in books devoted
only to the First Amendment. 5 This strikes me as a major omission, since it is the Fourteenth
4

Of course, I stand on the shoulders of fine work by historians. What I hope my excavations have added is a new
appreciation of some popular free speech ideas before and during the Civil War as they appear in these
controversies. My point about the incomplete free speech record in casebooks has been made by David Rabban.
See generally DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).
5

For constitutional law casebooks that have very little or no background on free speech battles from 1835 to 1866
and their relation to the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, NORMAN REDLICH, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 1996); JAMES A. BARRON, ET AL ., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (5th ed. 1996).
The 1996 edition of STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST A MENDMENT : CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS (1996) also begins with World War I cases. But see DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL ., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S 3RD CENTURY 408-10, 577-78 (2d ed. 1998) (presenting the incorporation debate
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment and discussing the Sedition Act as an introduction to the treatment of illegal
advocacy under the First Amendment).
A RNOLD LOEWY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT , CASES AND M ATERIALS (1999) begins with Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). GEOFFREY R. STONE , ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-8 (1999) devotes five pages to
free speech history with a discussion of the English background, the controversy over whether the First Amendment
was designed to change English law, a good, brief discussion of the Sedition Act, and a paragraph citing sources that
allow the reader to pursue the story from 1798 to 1917, which mentions the effort to suppress anti-slavery literature
and cites several articles and a book on the subject. It does not discuss the relation of the attempts to suppress antislavery and Republican speech to section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, but several of the sources cited do so.
The book also contains brief biographical sketches of leading justices.
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 2-4 (1999), devotes a little over
two pages to First Amendment history, including a discussion of the English law of prior restraints and seditious
libel, the issue of whether the First Amendment changed English law, and the Sedition Act of 1798. It devotes a
single paragraph (twelve lines) to later free speech history between the Sedition Act and World War I, mentioning
efforts to suppress abolitionist publications and free speech controversies during the Civil War--and citing one
source on each. It does not discuss the suppression of Republican speech in the South before the Civil War or the
relation of antebellum free speech controversies to the Fourteenth Amendment. The paragraph on free speech
history also cities the celebrated work of David Rabban on post Civil War and pre-World War I free speech
controversies.
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Amendment that requires the states to obey the guarantees of freedom of speech, press, petition,
assembly, and religion.
To the extent casebooks are designed to teach the current law through cases, it is not
quite fair to criticize them for an endeavor that most do not undertake. Today, some
constitutional law and free speech casebooks include more free speech history than has been
customary in the past, though most leave out the history from 1830 to 1868, or touch on it very
briefly. 6
There are good reasons for the omission. Until recently, constitutional scholars have
devoted little if any attention to the subject. Historians have paid more attention and have
produced some very fine studies to which I am indebted, but generally these have been studies of
particular events that did not seek to place the events in the larger matrix of American
constitutional law. 7 Typically, historians have not considered the relation of pre-Civil War free
The Sullivan & Gunther index contains no mention of incorporation of the Bill of Rights as a limit on the
states and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), is not included in the table of cases. The text does however
include Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) with its assumption “for present purposes” that “ freedom of
speech and press . . . are protected by the due process clause, and the text notes in a footnote, that the “dictum was
the Court’s first indication that First Amendment guarantees are ‘incorporated’ in the 14th Amendment.” SULLIVAN
& GUNTHER, supra, at 31.
W ILLIAM W. VAN A LSTYNE , FIRST AMENDMENT : CASES AND M ATERIALS 16-24, 58-73 (1995) does by far
the best job on the Fourteenth Amendment and free speech. It contains an extensive discussion of early free speech
history in its notes, though it does not specifically discuss the suppression of anti-slavery and Republican speech
before the Civil War. The book contains a detailed discussion of the relation of the Fourteenth Amendment to free
speech and press guarantees and some excerpts from the framing of the amendment. It cites scholarly works on all
sides of the incorporation issue. Supplements to First Amendment casebooks show increasing attention to free
speech history. For an extensive free speech history, see W ILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT , CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW CASES AND M ATERIALS (10th ed. 1997). The book devotes a paragraph to the controversy over anti-slavery
speech in the 1830s, but does not directly discuss later suppression of Republican speech or relate the issue to
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6

See supra note 5.

7

The Sedition Act has produced substantial scholarship. See, e.g., JAMES M ORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS:
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1966); LEONARD W. LEVY , THE EMERGENCE OF
A FREE PRESS (1985); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); David
M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37
STAN . L. REV. 795, 823 (1985). For the important contributions by ZECHARIAH CHAFEE , JR., see ZECHARIAH
CHAREE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 1 (1941). For free speech controversies after the Sedition
Act, see for example, CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH (1964) (1940)
(focusing on events in the Southern states); RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1972); W. SHERMAN SAVAGE , THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF
A BOLITION LITERATURE 1830-1860 (1968); JOHN LOFTON , THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1980). For a splendid and comprehensive history of the petition question, see W ILLIAM LEE MILLER, A RGUING
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speech struggles to section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, our second bill of rights. Nor
have they considered the relation of struggle over anti-slavery speech from 1830 to 1866 to
modern free speech ideas. As legal scholarship on the history of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its relation to free speech grows, perhaps the subject will receive more attention
in casebooks. 8
My casebooks from the 1960s did not actually make much in the way of statements about
free speech history. Instead, they simply presented certain cases, certain parts of the fossil
record. From those cases, readers might infer a story. If you used the casebooks I studied to
understand free speech history, you would get a story that left out quite a lot.
Here is the picture I got: In the beginning of free speech history, there was World War I. 9
At first, the courts adopted a narrow view of the types of speech that were protected by the First
Amendment. Speakers who intended to cause a violation of the selective service law, for
example, could be punished, and intent was judged by the natural tendency of their words. 10 So
a man who printed the Thirteenth Amendment on one side of his le aflet and a call for legal
measures to resist the draft on the other was guilty of violating the Espionage Act and sentenced
to prison. 11 Though my casebook did not tell me, court decisions were even worse than that. A
A BOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996). An excellent shorter account
appears in LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN QUINCY A DAMS (1986). For
another excellent discussion, see GILBERT H. BARNES, THE A NTISLAVERY IMPULSE (1933). For additional
nineteenth-century controversies, see DONNA L. DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF TOLERANCE : FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1990).
8

For fairly brief accounts of the relation of free speech struggles from 1830 to 1860 to the Fourteenth Amendment,
see W. W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman,“Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). See also, e.g., M ICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL A BRIDGE : THE FOURTEENTH
A MENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). For more recent and detailed accounts, see infra notes 58-59; 66; 75,
and see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). For another
perspective, see, for example, RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT , ch. 8 (2d ed. 1997).
9

E.g., NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND M ATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 903 (7th ed.
1965).
10

11

See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
Id. See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001

5

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8

man was sentenced to years in prison for refusing to kiss the flag, saying it was only cloth and
paint and might be covered with microbes;12 another was sentenced to jail for telling a woman
who was knitting socks for soldiers that no soldier would ever see those socks. 13
However, soon after World War I, Justices Holmes and Brandeis began to dissent, even
in cases involving people who did advocate illegal conduct. 14 Eventually, in the 1930s and
1940s, these dissents and other protective decisions became the source of a much more robust
free speech doctrine. 15 This protection was substantially diminished in the Communist cases of
the 1950s, 16 but was revived and strengthened in the 1960s. 17 This was the world according to
my casebooks of the 1960s and early 1970s, if the reader used them as free speech history books,
instead of as a tool to understand current law. Of course, the books were mainly designed to
teach current doctrine, not to survey free speech history.
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights as a limit on the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment was a minor part of the free speech story. The chapter on free speech did include
the 1925 case, Gitlow v. New York,18 the case in which the Supreme Court assumed, for purposes
of the decision, that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press limited the
states as a result of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court soon treated
the dicta in Gitlow as a square holding that the guarantees of free speech and press limited the
12

See Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920).

13

State v. Freerks, 168 N.W. 23 (M inn. 1918). For a fine discussion of the World War I era cases, see CHAFEE,
supra note 7, at 36-141.
14

E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
15

E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941).
16

E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

17

E.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ; Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
18

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); DOWLING & GUNTER, supra note 9, at 908.
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states under the Due Process Cla use. As a matter of persuasive legal method, treating an
assumption in dicta as a holding leaves something to be desired.
If the reader looked further, the picture would be much the same, but even bleaker. Some
books, no doubt, gave a more complete picture and told their readers about William Blackstone,
the famous commentator on English law who announced that freedom of the press was limited to
freedom from prior restraint. At one time in England the government licensed all publications.
Publishing without a license was a crime (regardless of what was in the publication), much as
driving without a license is a crime today, regardless of how perfect the driving may be.
According to Blackstone, free press meant that no license – no prior restraint – could be
required, but people could be punished for publications that had a bad tendency to cause harm.
Some early American court decisions followed Blackstone.
A reader who left the casebooks of the 1960s and looked in the United States Reports
might have found the 1907 case of Patterson v. Colorado.19 Tom Patterson was a crusading
newspaper editor who criticized the Colorado utility monopoly and favored municipal electric
power. In a referendum, state voters amended the state Constitution to allow home rule for
Denver. Home rule would have allowed Denver to establish municipal electric power. Voters
had also amended the state constitution to create new seats on the state supreme court, the
justices to be appointed by the newly elected governor. However, the lame-duck Republican
governor filled the court seats before they were scheduled to come into existence. The expanded
court held the constitutional amendment allowing municipal power in Denver unconstitutional,
as a violation of the very document being amended. This is a novel constitutional doctrine, to
say the least. The Colorado Supreme Court and the lame-duck legislature decided various
election contests so that the apparent election winners, including the Democratic pro-municipal
power candidate for governor, were now the losers.
19

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented. The story is elegantly told
in LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-7 (1991). The case also appears in VAN
A LSTYNE, supra note 5.
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Tom Patterson was outraged by the court’s conduct. In 1905, he wrote a stinging
editorial in his newspaper:
The people of St. Louis and San Francisco, who have been enjoying the full benefits of
just such a system of government as the amendment provides will be astonished to learn
that they no longer live in a republic–for the Colorado supreme court holds that such a
government is so unrepublican that it cannot be tolerated in Colorado. . . . What next? If
someone will let us know what the utility corporations of Denver and the political
machine they control will demand, the question will be answered. 20
Patterson made additional criticisms in this vein.
Patterson was cited for contempt for criticizing a particularly outrageous state supreme
court decision. The same court he had criticized summarily found him in contempt. Since the
charge was contempt, Patterson got no right to a jury trial. He was also denied the right to prove
that his charges were true. The United States Supreme Court upheld the state contempt
decision. 21 Speaking through Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court held that truth was no
defense – by analogy to the common law and the Blackstonian idea that the greater the truth, the
greater the libel. Holmes suggested that the First Amendment might not limit the states, but if it
did, it was merely a protection against prior restraint, not against subsequent punishment.
Because Patterson’s criticism had a bad tendency to interfere with the administration of criminal
justice, it could be punished. 22 Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court of the United States
essentially endorsed the crabbed view of free speech embraced by English judges and
commentators.
These (incomplete) pieces of the fossil record suggest that, as a matter of history, there
was far less to the guarantee of free speech than meets the eye. Still, students who continued to

20

People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Pub. Co., 84 P. 912, 913-14 (1906), quoted in POWE, supra note
19, at 3-4.
21

22

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented. Id.
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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search would find some cases that were more protective of speech. 23
At this point, step back and look at the historic right of free speech and think about what
it looks like if we attempt to reconstruct it from a casebook supplemented by early cases. What
sort of animal are we likely to build from the fossil remains of these cases? Taken as a whole,
the casebook fossil records suggest that the evidence for a robust historic right to free speech is
weak indeed. This historic view of free speech seems to provide very little protection for
controversial speech. Speech with a bad tendency to cause harm – as almost all controversial
speech does– can be banned. 24 Even truth may not be a defense. 25 Furthermore, there is
substantial authority that freedom of the press was originally intended to mean only freedom
from prior restraint. 26 Finally, because the guarantees of free speech in the First Amendment did
not limit the states before 1925, free speech was essentially a matter of local option. 27 My 1960s
casebook gave some, but not much, indication that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
change things – to require states to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, because it included
Justice Black’s dissent in Adamson, 28 together with a note implying that Charles Fairman had
effectively answered it. 29 Adamson did not appear in the section of the book devoted to free
speech, however. Many modern free speech ideas – that the free speech guarantee protects
uninhibited and robust discussion of matters of public concern; that the government cannot
23

See Michael Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
263 (1986). For a bleaker view, see David Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
(1981). Professor Rabban has looked at post-Civil War free speech history in his classic work, which is cited supra
at note 4.
24

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454 (1907).
25

26

27

28

Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462.
Id.
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); DOWLING & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 712.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J. dissenting).

29

DOWLING & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 730 (omitting Crosskey’s response to Fairman); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
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establish an orthodoxy; that the states must obey free speech commands; and that ideas may not
be banned because they are deeply offensive to some or even because the majority find them
offensive or because they might cause serious harm in the long run – seem to be a creation of the
dissents of the 1920s, and the decisions from 1930 to 1965 and later. 30
The Supreme Court began a far more robust protection of free speech in the 1930s. Free
speech became a potent right that limited states and localities as well as the national
government. 31 The trend continued in the Warren Court decisions of the 1960s. 32
In many areas of law, the Warren Court produced a judicial revolution–racial integration,
a criminal procedure revolution, and expanded protection for speech and press. Revolutions
spawn counter-revolutions. One of the key tenets embraced by many of the counterrevolutionaries was that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with original intent,
or later, in accordance with original meaning. According to its critics, the Warren Court had
failed to follow original intent. At times, at least, that was true for the Warren Court, 33 as it has
been for all its predecessors and for all its successors and for all the justices. 34 According to
some of its critics, because it departed from the original design as they understood it, the Warren
Court was wrong. 35 The critics’ claim was that we should look at the intentions of the Framers 36
or (later) the common understanding of the words of the constitutional text at the time of their

30

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
31

E.g., Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

32

E.g., Bond, 385 U.S. 116; Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); A Book
Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
33

Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

34

Scholars and judges, however, often have great difficulty in agreeing on specific cases. Cf. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
35

36

See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 8.
Id. at 199.
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adoption. 37
President Reagan’s Attorney General, Ed Meese, for example, suggested that the Framers
of the original Constitution had not intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. 38
According to Mr. Meese, this fact was established in the 1833 case of Barron v. Baltimore. 39
Meese implied that the incorporation doctrine was illegitimate. 40 Such a conclusion is of great
significance for free speech jurisprudence. If the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply the
guarantees of free speech, press, assembly, petition, and religion to the states, then the basis for
most Supreme Court cases protecting these rights has been removed.
A couple of things are worth noting. Mr. Meese’s Framers were the framers of 1787 and
1789. The 1866 Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were apparently not on his radar screen.
He said nothing about the history of state suppression of anti-slavery speech, press, and religion
from 1835 to 1866; he said nothing about the fact that Republicans had been targeted for
prosecution and suppression; and he said nothing about searches designed to find and burn antislavery literature. Southern laws that provided whipping, prison, or the death penalty for
opposition to slavery were apparently unknown to the Attorney General. Ed Meese, like the rest
of us, probably learned his constitutional history from case books, and these events probably did
not make it into his casebook.
Think for a moment about the fossil record that Ed Meese probably found in casebooks.
37

For a discussion of this method see, Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Court in a Civil Law System: The Role of the
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A M ATTER OF INTERPRETATION : FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). For earlier advocates of the method, see for example, W. W.
Crosskey, supra note 8, at 2-4.; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Though Frankfurter advocated the method in
Adamson, he did not practice what he preached. Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After
Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. RE V. 1071 (2000) [hereinafter
Curtis, Historical Linguistics].
38

39

Edwin Meese, Address before the American Bar Assn. 14 (July 9, 1985).
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).

40

Edwin Meese, Address before the American Bar Assn. 14 (July 9, 1985). Mr. Meese included these remarks in
the copy of his address given to the press, but did not deliver them orally during his speech, a discrepancy the press
copy warned the reader to expect. Perhaps the written copy was intended as a trial balloon.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001

11

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8

These books had treated history in a cursory fashion because they were designed to teach the
current law by means of illustrative cases. Events that do not produce cases–and typically
Supreme Court cases– tend not to make it into constitutional law casebooks. Even old cases
must be discarded to make room for new ones that establish new principles.
Although casebooks were not designed to survey the history of free speech, they supplied
much of the intellectual framework for those who decided that what was awkwardly called
“originalism” should be the means of constitutional analysis. For most law students, lawyers,
and judges, casebooks provide most of what they knew about free speech history.
Of course, scholars such as Raoul Berger had done historical analyses, 41 and Mr. Meese
may well have also relied on them without citing them. However, accounts like those of Mr.
Berger leave out very substantial parts of the story. They entirely omit, for example, the
struggles for free speech and civil liberty that were central to the battle over slavery that raged in
the United States between 1835 and 1866. Because so many casebooks left out so much of the
story, lawyers and judges may have been more inclined to believe deeply flawed accounts.
IV. FREE SPEECH STORIES
I now want briefly to examine three free speech stories. In the interest of space, I will
paint with a broad brush. The first, the Sedition Act, is the most familiar to free speech scholars,
though most students learn few, if any, of the details. Today, this story, in a very abbreviated
form, is often mentioned by casebooks.
A. The Sedition Act
In 1798, the Congress of the United States passed a statute that made it a crime to make
false and malicious criticisms of the president or Congress (both controlled by the Federalist
party). 42 Federalist proponents of the Act gave some examples of the sort of speech that needed
to be controlled: statements that Congress would pass unconstitutional acts, dangerous to the
41

BERGER, supra note 8, at ch.8.

42

Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596. See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE , supra
note 3, at 52-104.
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liberty of the people;43 and newspaper comments suggesting that the proposed Sedition Act
raised the question of whether there would soon be more freedom in Philadelphia or in
Constantinople. 44
An expressed rationale for the Sedition Act was that a republican government could not
survive unless the people had a good opinion of the government. Still, the Act did not protect all
elected officials. The Vice President and individual Republican members of Congress were not
protected by the Act. As it was interpreted and administered, the Act reached “false” opinions as
well as false facts. Statements by Republican congressmen and Republican newspaper editors
that President Adams lacked capacity for the job, was given to ridiculous pomp, and had
established a standing army produced prosecutions and convictions. 45
The Sedition Act was a law that punished criticism of the Federalist incumbent, but not
the Republican challenger; a law that allowed courts and juries to brand Jeffersonian political
views false and to punish them; and a law that protected the majority Federalists, but not the
Jeffersonian Republicans. It was enforced by prosecutors selected by the President and brought
before juries selected – and packed – by Federalist marshals and judges appointed by Federalist
presidents. The Act had a “sunset provision” so that it would expire with the end of the term of
Federalist President Adams.
Jeffersonian Republicans made three basic criticisms of the act. First, they insisted that
the Federal government lacked any power to prohibit speech or press. 46 Some said abuses of
these freedoms were matters for state courts. Jeffersonian Republicans pointed out, quite
correctly, that the original Constitution had been attacked because it lacked protection for
43

5 A NNALS OF CONG. 2093-98 (1798).

44

A URORA, Jan. 3, 1799, at 3.

45

E.g., United States v. Lyon, 15 F. Cas. 1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646); United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas.
631 (C. C. D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
46

5 A NNALS OF CONG. 2151 (1799); A MAR, supra note 8, at 36-37 (describing the lack of federal power over the
press).
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freedom of speech and press and that supporters of the Constitution had responded that critics
should be happy and not worry: the national government and Congress had no power over the
press, so no guarantee was needed. 47 (Anti- federalists had replied that power over speech and
press might be exercised under the Necessary and Proper Clause.) In response to these concerns,
the Bill of Rights provided that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of
the press. So Republicans insisted that speech and press had a double protection against federal
suppression. There was no power in the original Constitution and there was an explicit guarantee
in the First Amendment.
Without more, it might seem that Jeffersonian Republicans thought of the guarantee of
free speech as merely a jurisdictional device, a division of power in the federal system. But there
was more. Jeffersonian Republicans also said that the Sedition Act was inconsistent with free
speech and press, which guaranteed a full right to discuss the public character and acts of public
officials and all questions of public policy. 48 Republicans denied that freedom of speech was
simply a protection against prior restraint. 49 English precedent might be suited to a monarchy
with a hereditary House of Lords, but it was not suitable for a nation founded on the ideal of
popular sovereignty. Those who made these arguments demanded a broader protection of free
speech than that which orthodox legal understanding provided. They drew on and developed the
heritage of radical dissent that stretched from the Levellers of the English Civil War period
through the Radical Whigs and Cato’s Letters.
Finally, Jeffersonian Republicans noted that the Act was a political device prepared for
party purposes that would be enforced by politically motivated functionaries. Political trials
would produce political verdicts. 50
47

48

49

50

A MAR, supra note 8, at 36-37.
5 A NNALS OF CONG. 2140-41 (1798).
Id. at 2160; Congressional Conundrum, A URORA, Feb. 28, 1799, at 3; TIME PIECE (N.Y.), July 13, 1798, at 2.
5 A NNALS OF CONG. 2140, 2162 (1798).
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Federalists defended the Act as fully consistent with free speech and press. They cited
Blackstone and English precedent. 51 Freedom of speech was merely a protection against prior
restraint. It protected the proper use of speech, not its abuse. Speech or press with a bad
tendency could be punished. 52 Why, they demanded, did Republicans object to a law designed to
punish malicious lying? 53
In the prosecutions that followed, where were the courts? James Madison had told the
first Congress that a bill of rights would enable the courts to protect basic liberties; a bill of rights
would arm the courts with the power to enforce its guarantees and the courts would become an
impenetrable barrier against violation of these basic guarantees. 54
In the case of the Sedition Act, it did not work out that way. Judges, including Supreme
Court justices, trotted around their circuits and lectured grand juries on the constitutionality of
the Sedition Act. They behaved just as the Republicans in Congress had feared. Federalist
judges convicted Republicans. The judges were often more aggressive prosecutors than the
prosecutors themselves. 55
Jefferson was elected president in 1800 (with the help of the Three- fifths Clause). The
Sedition Act expired, and Jefferson pardoned those convicted of violating the act. By 1840, in
spite of the earlier decisions by Supreme Court justices on circuit upholding the Act, there was a
broad national consensus that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. A congressional committee
recommended, and Congress passed by an overwhelming majority, a bill refunding the fine that
Republican congressman Matthew Lyon had paid for violating the Act, “so as to place beyond
question the mandate of the Constitution against abridging the liberty of the press.” The bill was
51

52

53

54

55

A Charge Delivered to the Grand Jury of the U. States, A URORA, May 23, 1799, at 2.
E.g., Sketch of Chief Justice Dana’s Charge, M ASSACHUSETTS MERCURY, Jan. 1, 1799, at 1.
5 A NNALS OF CONG. 2112 (1798).
2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1030-31 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1971).
United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631 (C. C. D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
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supported by both Waddy Thompson, a strong supporter of slavery from South Carolina and by
Representative Slade, an anti-slavery congressman from Lyon’s district in Vermont. 56
B. Abolition
The consensus on free speech and federal power obscured a fundamental issue as to state
power. In the mid 1830s, some assumed that the suppression of speech or press by the states was
a different matter from federal suppression–a question for each state to decide. For these people,
free speech was a matter of local option. Supreme Court decisions supported this view. The Bill
of Rights, the Court ruled in 1833, limited only the national government, not the states. 57 While
many dissented, this was the orthodox judicial view.
The scope and meaning of freedom of speech, press, and religion became crucial as
slavery became the central political issue racking the nation. Northern states had largely
abolished slavery. In the South, the institution was becoming more entrenc hed. To understand
what happened next, it is useful to know the story that much of the nation was telling itself about
slavery: of course, slavery was an evil, but the evil was not the responsibility of Americans in the
1830s. It was the fault of the British who had imposed the system on the colonies. Because
many thought that freeing the slaves and integrating them into American society was not a viable
option, and because deporting and colonizing so many people seemed impractical and too
expensive, the solution must be left to time and providence. God should be trusted to solve
problems too complex for man. 58 On the issue of slavery, the proper course was to sit on one’s
hands and button one’s lips.
Perhaps nations, like individuals, engage in repression, concealing from their conscious
minds truths about the bleaker side of their character. At any rate, to a remarkable degree, many
56

57

CONG. GLOBE , 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1840).
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).

58

See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE ’S DARLING PRIVILEGE , supra note 3, at 125-33; Michael Kent
Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery, Speech, Press, and Petitions in 1835-37, 89 NW .
U. L. REV. 785, 786-802 (1995) [hereinafter Curtis, Curious History].
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Americans repressed thoughts about slavery and what the peculiar institution said about our
nation and its ideals.
In the mid-1830s, the Abolitionist bull charged into this political and psychological china
shop. Abolitionists insisted that slavery was an evil, a sin. But those responsible were the
American slaveholders of the day, not English men from the dim past. Slaveholders were “manstealers,” receivers of stolen goods, violators of God’s law, and criminals against humanity. The
abolitionist solution was for slaveholders to renounce immediately the sin of slavery. By not
doing what it could to end the institution, the rest of the nation was at fault as well.
To bring the sin of slavery directly to the attention of slaveholders, abolitionists mailed
large numbers of anti-slavery tracts to the Southern elite. Abolitionists combined moral and
prudential arguments. They warned of the danger of slave revolts and suggested abolition as a
solution. Their tracts were often illustrated with wood-cut prints of masters mistreating slaves.
The illustrations were particularly appalling to the critics of the abolitionists. Though the
Southern states had made it a crime to teach slaves to read–in order to protect them from
infection by anti-slavery ideas– there was no way to insulate them from pictures.
The South exploded. Men entered the Charleston, South Carolina, post office and seized
and burned abolitionist publications. In the South, public meetings and legislatures demanded
action to silence abolitionists. Throughout much of American history, including the civil rights
revolution of the 1960s, many southerners accepted a comforting mythology. Blacks – slave or
later free – were content and relations between whites and blacks were happy and friendly. But
this idyllic condition could be shattered by outside agitators. Abolitionists were the original
outside agitators. (Of course, inside agitators were even worse.)
But the South was not alone. In public meetings throughout the North, former Federalists
such as Harrison Gray Otis and Chancellor Kent joined Democrats in resolutions that demanded
that the abolitionists shut up. As the critics saw it, abolitionist speech had a very bad tendency to
cause slave revolts, sectionalism, and civil war. It did not matter that typically abolitionists did
not then advocate these things. Since critics thought these calamities were the natural long-term

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001

17

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8

results to be expected from strident anti-slavery speech, the speech had to be silenced, though
there was considerable confusion as to how that result could or should be accomplished.
Mobs broke up abolitionist meetings in the North; northern and border state politicians
celebrated the mobs as enforcing a wisdom above and beyond all law; and southern mobs and
laws punished those who expressed anti-slavery sentiment. In Cincinnati, an anti-abolition mob
destroyed the press of James Birney’s paper, the Philanthropist. The mayor of the town was one
of the leaders of the mob. The well- to-do were well represented in the anti-abolitionist mobs.
These were respectable mobs, made up of gentlemen of property and standing. Many feared that
the slavery issue would disrupt trade between the North and the South. As is the case today,
many wanted to avoid questions of human rights so as not to disrupt trade. 59
At the national level, Congress passed a “gag rule” requiring that petitions touching on
the subject of slavery be laid on the table and not discussed. It considered a bill to ban
abolitionist publications from the mails. The Postmaster General announced that postmasters
had no legal authority to keep abolitionist publications out of the mails, but he encouraged them
to do so anyway. He explained that postmasters owe an obligation to the laws, but a higher
obligation to their communities. The New York postmaster embargoed abolitionist publications,
effectively blockading the abolitionist postal appeal to Southerners. 60
The attack on the free speech rights of abolitionists produced a reaction. While, at first
there was little public support for abolitionists (in the North or South) and substantial public
support for the idea that they should shut up, there was also substantial support for free speech.
Southern legislatures demanded laws to suppress abolitionist meetings and publications in the
North. But no Northern legislature complied. Non-abolitionists began to criticize mobs, gag
59

CURTIS, F REE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE ’S DARLING PRIVILEGE , supra note 3, at 125-51; Curtis, Curious History, supra
note 58, at 809-13; Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob: Free Speech,
Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1109, 1118-42 (1997)
[hereinafter Curtis, Lovejoy].
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rules, and proposals to ban abolitionist speech as a violation of democracy and free speech.
Congress failed even to pass a watered-down bill aimed at the abolitionist postal campaign. The
proposed bill would simply have directed Southern postmasters not to deliver publications
dealing with slavery which also violated state laws. A number of congressmen suggested that
congress lacked power to limit freedom of the press – and (ominously) several said that states
could deal with the problem. 61
Although the postal bill failed to pass, postmasters, nonetheless, continued to embargo
abolitionist publications. Opposition to the gag rule mounted and it was finally revoked in
1844.62
To protect its peculiar institution, the Southern elite believed the institution must expand
into new territories. Otherwise, the slave states would soon be hopelessly outnumbered in the
national government. Slavery was becoming a gut political issue because slavery in the
territories confronted free white workers with direct competition with slave labor and white
workers and farmers feared that the invisible hand would gradually reduce them, like the slaves,
to bare subsistence. But in slave territories, even the right to oppose slavery was imperiled.
Slave territories had to have slave codes and the Southern censorship regime.
Security for slavery also required exporting some slave state institutions to the North.
Since the nation was connected by roads, canals, the postal system, and the media, the Southern
rule of silence about slavery needed to be exported to the North.
In the years after 1835, abolitionists and others began to reframe the issue. The question
was no longer simply freedom for the slave; it implicated the freedom of all Americans because
slavery was inherently hostile to liberty, even in the North. Slavery and liberty were
incompatible. Abolitionists and others began to suggest that freedom of speech, press, and
61

CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE , supra note 3, at 164-93; Curtis, Curious History,
supra note 58, at 813-59.
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religion were basic rights of all Americans everywhere in the nation and were protected by both
state and national constitutions.
Elijah Lovejoy was an anti-slavery minister who edited a religious newspaper. When he
spoke out against slavery and mob violence, his press was destroyed, and he was driven from the
slave state of Missouri. Lovejoy relocated to Alton, Illinois, but there also mobs continued to
harass him, again and again seizing his press and dumping it in the Mississippi river. Next,
Lovejoy and friends barricaded the press in a stone warehouse and stationed armed guards.
Ultimately, Lovejoy was killed as he and his allies sought to protect his fourth press from a
mob. 63 The event caused a national sensation, a “political earthquake” as John Quincy Adams
described it. The killing of Lovejoy underlined the threat that slavery posed to liberty, even in
the North. 64
The conflict over slavery and free speech provoked people to express basic ideas about
free speech. Supporters of suppression espoused a number of constitutional theories to justify
silencing opponents of slavery. First, the Southern elite and their allies suggested that
abolitionist speech could be suppressed because of its bad tendency to cause slave revolts and
sectional conflict. Second, they noted that the Constitution recognized slavery. As a result, antislavery speech violated the constitutional compact and was not entitled to protection. The proslavery policy of the constitution trumped any free speech claim. Third, they argued that antislavery speech was seditious. Fourth, it was similar to libel. Just as libel and slander of
individuals were criminal, so was libel of the entire group of slaveholders. Finally, these attacks
on slavery inflicted emotional distress on slaveholders–wounded their feelings–and that was
another justification for suppression. If Northern constitutions protected such abuses of free
speech, Southerners insisted, then Northerners must promptly change their constitutions. 65
63
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The defenders of free speech treated it as a right that belonged to all Americans. All
people had the right to discuss political, moral, and social questions and to espouse any theory
they chose. Free speech protected the poet, the philosopher, and the scientist. All people had an
interest in its preservation. The majority had no right to silence the minority. Government could
not establish orthodox opinion. The defenders insisted that free speech protected hateful and evil
ideas as well as virtuous ones. Constitutional values such as republican government (or the
protection of slavery) did not justify silencing other points of view. People were still free to
advocate monarchy or to attack cherished institutions such as marriage. 66 By the later 1830s,
more and more people began to assert that Southern laws that silenced anti-slavery speech
violated the federal Constitution and denied a basic privilege of American citizenship.
In the Southern states as well as in the national government, Southern slaveholders had
more political power than their numbers justified. Some slave states had their own state threefifths clauses; in some states, legislative apportionment gave slaveholding areas excess power.
So in the nation at large and in the South, slavery multiplied and then re- multiplied the political
power of slave holders. Where slavery was strongest, it used its inflated political power to
protect the institution from the democratic process.
Southern politicians began to demand ever greater protection for slavery–more slave
states to balance the free states; territories open to slavery; and more vigorous enforcement of the
fugitive slave laws. The demand to expand the domain of slavery eventually produced a
powerful anti-slavery party in the North–a party that called itself Republican. (This was the
second Republican party in American history. Jeffersonian Republicans had begun to call
themselves Democrats.) Meanwhile, in its determination to protect the institution of slavery, the
South was becoming a closed society.
66

CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE , supra note 3, ch. 9; Curtis, Curious History, supra
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C. The Rise of the Second Republican Party and the Suppression of Republican Speech
By 1856 to 1859, slavery was the main political issue facing the nation. A great national
party had been formed based on a policy of containment – to prohibit slavery in the territories.
While Republicans disclaimed any national power to abolish slavery, they insisted that slavery
was wrong and must be put on the road to ultimate extinction.
When I studied this subject in high school and college, it was hard to understand why the
South seceded. Republicans, after all, were merely committed to limiting slavery to the South.
But actually, more was at stake. Republicans hoped to develop a Republican opposition in each
Southern state and to attack slavery from within the Southern states themselves. Southern
slaveholders were unwilling to expose slavery to the vicissitudes of Southern anti-slavery
political agitation, convinced that the institution could not survive it. 67
In 1856, in North Carolina, Benjamin Hedrick was a talented and popular professor of
Chemistry at the University of North Carolina. He announced his support for John C. Fremont,
the Republican candidate for president. As a result, Hedrick was fired from his teaching job at
Chapel Hill, and a mob drove him from the state.
In 1857, another North Carolinian, Hinton Rowan Helper wrote a book attacking slavery.
Helper called on non-slaveholding white Southerners to unite for political action to abolish
slavery at the state level. Helper insisted that slavery caused Southern economic backwardness,
and it injured non-slaveholding whites. 68 According to Helper’s plan, slaveowners would not be
compensated. Instead, they would be taxed to provide support for the emancipated slaves who
chose colonization or relocation to the North.
Helper called for free speech and democratic action. But if “the lords of the lash” and
their “cringing lickspittles” used violence against the anti-slavery party, Helper said the nonslaveholders should resist. There were, he pointed out, at least three non-slaveholders to every
67
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slaveholder, not counting the slaves who “in nine cases out of ten would be delighted to cut their
master's throats.”69
Helper’s book got an enthusiastic reception from Republicans. Here was a Southerner
who pointed out the danger slavery posed to the free white laborers in the South and the danger
slavery in the territories would pose for the people of the North. Three- fourths of the
Republicans in the House endorsed a plan to publish an abridged version of the book as a
campaign document. The endorsers included two Ohioans: John A. Bingham, future author of
most of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, and John Sherman, a candidate for Speaker
of the House. 70
Then John Brown launched his raid on Harper’s Ferry, in an effort to start an anti-slavery
guerilla war. Initially, abolitionists had favored peaceful methods. Now, however, after years of
Southern suppression of anti-slavery speech, some militant abolitionists favored violence.
Republicans, typically, did not. Yet, many Democrats saw Republicans as fellow travelers.
Democrats in Congress sought to use the most inflammatory passages in Helper’s book to
tie Republicans, including John Sherman, to the Harper’s Ferry raid. Helper, they said, had
written an incendiary book; it advocated fire, arson, and cutting throats. This was not a fair
reading of the book, but that is how many Southerners and their allies read it. These Democrats
portrayed Republicans as accessories before the fact to the John Brown crime. The proof was
that they endorsed Helper’s book. A North Carolina grand jury actually sought extradition of the
endorsers of the book. North Carolina sent a request to the governor of New York to extradite all
endorsers, including, incidentally, the governor himself. The governor did not comply with the
request. In the South, endorsers and circulators of Helper’s book were treated as felons. In the
North, the endorsers and circulators were mainstream leaders and members of the Republican
party.
69
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Sherman and a few conservative endorsers repudiated the book, saying feebly that they
had not read it. 71 But a number of Republicans defended the book. They insisted on freedom for
anti-slavery speech directed to white southerners. They said Southern states were violating
national constitutional guarantees of free speech, free press, and freedom of religion. They
called for freedom of speech on all public questions, all social questions, “all questions that
concern the human race” and endorsed “the boldest discussion.”72 They denied that Helper’s
book advocated arson and murder. Those who made such charges, these Republican said, had
never read the book. They demanded that the South protect “Northern citizens” in “the
enjoyment of their constitutional rights.” They said, in the words of one Republican
congressman, “the North demands freedom of speech and of the press; and if your peculiar
institution cannot stand before them, let it go down.”73
In response to the uproar over Helper’s book, every Republican in the Senate who voted
on the matter supported the following free speech resolution:
[F]ree discussion of the morality and expedience of slavery should never be interfered
with by the laws of any State, or and the United States; and the freedom of speech and of
the press, on this and every other subject of domestic and national policy should be
maintained inviolate in all the states. 74
The Senate resolution was consistent with the Republican campaign slogan: “free speech, free
soil, free territories, free labor, and free men.”
In discussions of free speech and slavery in the years between 1835 and 1866, people
commonly described freedom of speech, press, and religion, as well as other liberties protected
by the Bill of Rights as privileges or immunities of American citizens that no state should
abridge. This fact and the history I have discussed illuminate the likely common understanding
71

CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE , supra note 3, at 776; Curtis, Helper, supra note 66, at
1144-47.
72

73

74

Curtis, Helper, supra note 66, at 1154.
Id. at 1146-59.
Id. at 1157-58.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss1/8

24

24

Curtis: Teaching Free Speech

of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “No state shall . . . abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”75
The southern intellectual blockade was enforced by the courts. Daniel Worth was a 68year-old minister preaching an anti-slavery version of the gospel in Guilford and Randolph
Counties of North Carolina. Worth was a Republican activist. He sold copies of Hinton
Helper’s Impending Crisis and subscriptions to the New York Tribune, a Republican newspaper.
For distributing copies of Impending Crisis, Worth was arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison.
He was convicted of violating a North Carolina statute that forbade disseminating pamphlets
with a tendency to make free blacks or slaves discontent and sentenced to prison. 76
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld Worth’s conviction. 77 If people were allowed
to give such books to whites who might favor the scheme, the North Carolina court explained,
the inevitable tendency would be for the ideas in such books and pamphlets to reach the blacks. 78
The result was that, on the subject of slavery, white voters could be reduced to reading only
items suitable for slaves. A Raleigh newspaper urged public officials and postmasters to
carefully search for and burn the Republican New York Tribune and letters from Republican
congressmen. 79 As a result of the uproar over the Helper book, the North Carolina legislature
changed the statute under which Worth had been convicted. Henceforth, the death penalty
should be imposed for the first offense. 80
This history illuminates the campaign slogan of the Republican party: “free speech, free
75
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men, free territory, free soil.” It explains what Republicans like Abraham Lincoln and Lyman
Trumbull were complaining about when they objected to the inability of Republicans to
campaign in the South. 81 When Lincoln urged Republicans not to be intimidated by threats of
dungeons, this history explains what he was talking about. 82
John Bingham, who later wrote section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, had been an
endorser of the book and, as many Southerners saw it, he was a felon who should be hung. In
1866, three of the seven Republican members of the Joint Committee that framed the Fourteenth
Amendment (including Bingham) had endorsed the book. So had the Republican speaker of the
House of Representatives. 83 When Bingham and others said the Fourteenth Amendment was
needed to protect free speech, people at the time knew what they meant.
D. Anti-war Speech during the Civil War
In 1863, during some of the darkest days of the Civil War, Union General Ambrose
Burnside arrested Ohio Democratic politician Clement Vallandigham for making an anti-war
political speech. Burnside was in command of the military district that included Ohio. Ohio was
not a battleground. Burnside had previously issued General Order 38: "The habit of declaring
sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this Department. Persons committing such
offenses will be at once arrested. . . . [T]reason, express or implied, will not be tolerated in this
Department."84
Vallandigham was a racist and a critic of the war. Still, he had been careful in his public
statements to urge obedie nce to the law and the draft, and to suggest that redress must be sought
at the polls. He attacked General Order Number 38. He insisted that his right to free speech did
not depend on permission from General Burnside. It came from “General Order Number 1,” the
81
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Id. at 1152-53.
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Constitution.
The charge on which the military tribunal tried Vallandigham reads as follows:
[T]hat the said Clement L. Vallandigham, a citizen of the State of Ohio, on or
about the first day of May, 1863, at Mount Vernon, Knox County, Ohio, did
publicly address a large meeting of citizens, and did utter sentiments in words, or
in effect, as follows, declaring the present war "a wicked, cruel, and unnecessary
war;" "a war not being waged for the preservation of the Union;" "a war for the
purpose of crushing out liberty and erecting a despotism;" "a war for the freedom
of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites;" stating "that if the
Administration had so wished, the war could have been honorably terminated
months ago;" that "peace might have been honorably obtained by listening to the
proposed intermediation of France;" . . . [C]harging that "the Government of the
United States was about to appoint military marshals in every district, to restrain
the people of their liberties, to deprive them of their rights and privileges;"
characterizing General Order No. 38 from Head-quarters Department of the Ohio,
as a "base usurpation of arbitrary authority," inviting his hearers to resist the
same, by saying, "the sooner the people inform the minions of us urped power that
they will not submit to such restrictions upon their liberties, the better;". . . . All of
which opinions and sentiments he well knew did aid, comfort, and encourage
those in arms against the Government, and could but induce in his hearers a
distrust of their own Government, sympathy for those in arms against it, and a
disposition to resist the laws of the land. 85

Burnside tried Vallandigham before his hand-picked military commission. Not surprisingly, the
commission convicted and sentenced him to prison and hard labor. Significantly, this was a
military trial of a civilian, outside the area of military conflict, where the civil courts were
functioning. The offense was making a political speech opposing the war policy of the
administration, while urging obedience to the laws and redress at the polls. Lincoln changed
Vallandigham’s sentence to exile to the Confederacy. 86
Soon Burnside struck again. This time he seized the Chicago Times newspaper and
prohibited further publication–ignoring a temporary restraining order from a federal judge. This
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time Lincoln overruled his General. 87
Both of Burnside’s actions produced substantial public protest. The protest came not
only from pro- and anti-war Democrats, but from a number of Repub licans and abolitionists.
Public resolutions insisted that free speech was a “home bred right, a fireside privilege.”
Democrats insisted that men called on to fight and die must have the right to discuss the wisdom
of the war and how it should be carried out. The massive public protest seems to have induced
Lincoln privately to rein in his generals. Yet, while he privately instructed generals to avoid
such tactics, Lincoln publicly defended the military arrest of Vallandigham and, indeed, the
arrest of anyone who remained silent upon hearing such disloyal sentiments expressed. 88
This time it was the Democrats who appealed to popular sovereignty and freedom of
speech and press, as well as to constitutional safeguards such as jury trial and grand jury
indictment. Significantly, Democrats also described these fundamental rights as constitutional
privileges or immunities of American citizens. 89 The Democratic protests were supported by
many Republicans and abolitionists.
When Congressman Long from Ohio introduced a resolution in 1863 that said the Civil
War could not be won without undue suffering and urged that the South be allowed to go in
peace, the Republicans in Congress introduced a resolution for his expulsion. But leading
Republican newspapers joined Democrats in criticizing the attempted expulsion as a violation of
republican government and free speech, and the attempt to expel Long was withdrawn and
replaced with a censure motion. 90
E. Where the Defense of Free Speech Comes From
From the Sedition Act through the Civil War, free speech received little protection from
87
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the courts. Courts upheld an act that made it a crime to utter “false” opinions about an
incumbent president, but not about his challenger. 91 Southern state courts upheld statutes that
made it criminal for one voter to criticize the institution of slavery to another. 92 When a union
general in the state of Ohio arrested a Democratic politician for urging people to obey the laws
but to repudiate the war policy of the administration at the polls, a federal judge refused to issue
a writ of habeas corpus. There was, he suggested, too much of the pestilential leaven of
disloyalty abroad in the land. 93
While the judges did little to protect free speech, citizens, politicians, and activists did
much more. They insisted on the right to criticize public men and public measures – to discuss
all political, moral, and social questions on every inch of American soil. Crucial constitutional
decisions were made outside of the courts– in Northern legislatures that refused to suppress antislavery speech and in the “court of public opinion.” The right to engage in robust and wide-open
discussion of public affairs that was protected in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan94 had its
antecedents in the free speech struggles before and during the Civil War. Perhaps the popular
defense of free speech and the passive or negative role of the courts should not be too surprising.
Courts are, in many ways, lagging indicators.
During Reconstruction, the story of suppression of anti-slavery speech in the South was
re-enacted in a new setting. Terrorist bands attacked and intimidated African-American voters
and their Republican allies. The United States Supreme Court made it quite difficult for the
national government to suppress politically motivated private– as opposed to governmental–
violence in the Southern states that was aimed at suppressing Republican speech and
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association. 95 In the 1890s, tactics of violence and intimidation were also used against Southern
populists as well as against Republicans. 96 In spite of the guarantees of the Fifteenth
Amendment (and even ignoring section two of the Fourteenth Amendment), African-Americans
were deprived of the right to vote in large parts of the South. 97
For much of American history, there was neither democracy nor free speech on issues of
race and on many basic economic issues in much of the South. Since the nation now counted
disfranchised Southern Americans of African descent for purposes of representation, it swelled
the political power of the Southern states, a power that was used again and again to thwart
progressive change.
Proponents of free speech insisted that free speech was indivisible. As they saw it,
attacks on the free speech rights of even the despised abolitionists threatened the free speech
rights of all. Many abolitionists and Republicans, in turn, defended the free speech rights of
racists such as Vallandigham and the Chicago Times. They warned that establishing a principle
to suppress racist reactionaries today could be turned against advocates of progress tomorrow.
Ideas that government may not ordain an orthodoxy, must be ideologically neutral in its
regulations of speech, and the rejection of the bad tendency approach stretch back at least to the
debates over the Sedition Act and anti-slavery speech. 98
The federal system had both protected and suppressed speech. It protected it in the North
and allowed its suppression in the South.
V. FREE SPEECH HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL M EANING
Those who deny that the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to protect any rights in
95
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the Bill of Rights from state abridgment–not even free speech, press, religion, and assembly– are
forced to ignore the lessons of this history as it bears on original intent, original meaning, and the
historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed. In theory, our nation is
founded on popular sovereignty, and the Constitution is legitimated as an expression of the will
of “We the People.” As a result, attempts to find original understanding simply in ancient court
decisions and musty treatises is not adequate. Constitutional law limited to these sources leaves
out crucial parts of the story. A much larger group of people–men and women, black and white–
were crucial constitutional actors. Those who search the past for the meaning of free speech
should also explore the complex question of how this privilege and immunity of American
citizens was understood in 1866 to1868. In a nation founded on popular sovereignty, popular
understanding of the meaning of a constitutional amendment should count.
Casebooks have been caught in a time warp. Most were designed to teach the current
version of the law and, to a lesser extent, to present some cases that illustrate an earlier judicial
approach. Casebooks typically emphasize precedent and doctrinal analysis. Some modern
casebooks also provide very extensive commentary on what law professors think about the
current state of the law. Crucial constitutional events that do not produce Supreme Court cases
rarely appear in most casebooks. Original intent – or original meaning – has never been more
than one of the many important factors in shaping the law, so casebooks’ attention to the history
implicated by ideas of original understanding has been episodic.
While casebooks were teaching precedent and doctrine, a number of influential judges
and legal thinkers were writing manifestos for a judicial revolution. In their view, original intent
or original meaning – based on their understanding of the historical record– is the true key to
interpreting the Constitution. Taken to its logical extreme–although, perhaps, few are willing to
press it that far–the manifesto might begin: “Strict constructionists unite! You have nothing to
lose but your New Deal era and Warren Court precedents!” My own view is that history and
original meaning are important factors in constitutional analysis, but they are only factors. Other
factors to consider include the text and structure of the Constitution, precedent, and ethical
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aspirations. We must also consider how our changed background understanding of issues such
as race and gender must affect the application of the principles the Framers embraced. The same
is true for changes in society, such as the development of an integrated national market and for
technological changes such as wiretapping.
In a nation based on popular sovereignty, the original common understanding of a
constitutional provision or of an amendment should at least be that of the politically active
people at the time of enactment. Skeptics may doubt that such an understanding can be found
and many, including myself, doubt that it can be the only factor to consider. But one thing is
certain, as the case of free speech shows: if we want to have a full picture of this constitutional
animal–and a full understanding of how the Constitution works and what sustains our liberties–
these questions cannot be adequately answered based on the incomplete fossil record gathered in
casebooks that were designed to serve very different purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are good reasons to teach constitutional law as it is taught. Most cases are decided
based on factors other than history. The justification most often cited is precedent. So a
wholesale revision would hardly be in order. But if we want students to better understand free
speech and the incorporation doctrine that makes it a national right, we can tell them about some
of the stories I have described. These stories illuminate the meaning of free speech in a
democracy. Students of constitutional law benefit from at least a brief discussion of the Sedition
Act and the arguments for and against it, and some books now provide it. They would also
benefit from learning about some of the episodes in the effort to suppress anti-slavery and
Republican speech, about the free speech ideas that were mobilized for and against suppression,
and how this history relates to application to the states of the free speech, press, petition, and
religion guarantees through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lawyers are, among other things, people who make arguments. The larger context of the
Fourteenth Amendment is one good way to teach about arguments from text (both the immediate
words and how they echo other parts of the Constitutional text), history, precedent, original
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meaning, structure, and ethical aspirations. 99 History, as well as precedent, can provide
paradigm cases. 100 To understand the meaning of the guarantees of free speech, a single
pertinent story may provide a deeper understanding than several cases. Historical episodes can
help to explain reasons for constitutional protections in a uniquely powerful way. History has
other important functions: it shows how constitutional law is made outside of courts, and it
underlines the lesson that, in the final analysis, liberty depends on the understanding and support
of a free people. Many of these stories are inspiring stories in which ordinary and extraordinary
people were standing up and protecting constitutional liberties for others, even though the courts
were doing a miserable job of protecting these liberties.
Of course, change implies loss as well as gain. If we have more stories from free speech
history, we will have less room for cases and doctrine. But history can provide lawyers and
students with meaning and context, and locate their efforts in the larger context of our nation’s
history. For individuals, for families, and for nations, the stories we tell about our past are
important ways of understanding our identity. 101 History locates us in the concentric circles of
family, community, and nation. Connection to the past adds meaning to the present. For
individuals and nations, the best understanding comes from looking at the bleaker – as well as
the brighter – side of our natures.
Sadly, over the long haul of American history, judges have often done a poor job of
protecting the constitutional rights of the poor and oppressed. Pennsylvania, like many Northern
states, had abolished slavery and had a number of free blacks. These had long sought protection
against kidnaping and being hauled into slavery. The legislature of Pennsylvania attempted to
supply such protection by requiring a judicial determination of whether black people were slaves
or free before they were removed from Pennsylvania for purposes of enslaving them. In Prigg v.
99
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Pennsylvania,102 the United States Supreme Court voided a Pennsylvania state law that required
a judicial determination before a person was removed from the state as a slave. The Court held
that slave owners had a constitutional right to seize alleged slaves in free states and take them
back to a slave state without any judicial process at all. This was so even though, in free states,
all people were presumed free; in slave states, mere color gave rise to a presumption of slavery.
As the court saw it, any delay in the right of the alleged slave owner, including the delay required
for a due process hearing, was intolerable. So slaveowners could capture and remove alleged
slaves with no process at all. 103
Dred Scott held that free Americans descended from slaves had no rights that a white
man was bound to respect– no federal Constitutional rights at all. 104 During and after
Reconstruction, the Court went a long way toward holding that Congress lacked the power to
protect American citizens from violence designed to punish them for free speech and for their
political allegiances. 105 In the Lochner era, courts too often interpreted constitutional guarantees
to protect concentrated economic power from the democratic process. 106 The role of the courts
in early free speech history is also often disappointing.
Understanding the broader context of American constitutional history holds a final
important lesson: courts can be important guardians of liberty, but they have often failed to
uphold their trust. Constitutional liberty is too important a matter to be left exclusively to the
judges. We need redundant safety devices. The ship of liberty requires lifeboats as well as a
double hull; 107 it requires popular support as well as protective precedent.
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There is a natural tendency to think that the views and efforts of ordinary citizens do not
matter. As these stories show, that is a profound mistake. If we want our students to understand
our full heritage of liberty, how each generation must struggle for it anew, and how many
ordinary Americans have contributed to it, then we might teach about constitutional actors
outside the courts – about the men and women, black and white, abolitionists, anti-slavery
activists, Populists, Progressives, and others who fought to make the United States the land the
Declaration of Independence, the preamble to the Constitution, and the Pledge of Allegiance
promise: a land of “liberty and justice for all.”
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